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ABSTRACT
Hegemonic Conflict in the Caspian Region:
Accumulation by Dispossession and the Spatial Fix
Patrick Ehland
This research examines the political-economic and military activities of three major powers, the
United States, China and Russia, in the Caspian region, comprising the nation states of
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan, since the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The activities of these three powers have been guided
primarily by resource and strategic needs, and they have had a significant effect on the uneven
development of the Caspian states. The interests and actions of the three powers have frequently
come into conflict with each other, and the responses of the individual Caspian states have varied
widely. The research uses Harvey’s concepts of the spatial fix and accumulation by
dispossession and Arrighi’s concept of hegemonic decline and conflict to understand the uneven
development of this region.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought major changes to the geopolitical
landscape. The Cold War was over, and the United States was the new dominant hegemon in the
world. The US saw its new position as the undisputed leader to further its own goals and
reinforce its power. The neoliberalist approach of the US and the Western world, championed by
Reagan and Britain’s Thatcher, and continued by George H.W. Bush and then Bill Clinton saw a
rising tide of American influence across the globe. The free market ideology of neoliberalism has
been a driving force of economic globalization since the 1980s, which has allowed the US and
US corporations to profit from access to cheap labor and resources.
The US has long been the world’s leading consumer of gas and oil, but globalization has
greatly increased the demand for fossil fuel energy resources in emerging East Asian economies,
India, and an expanding European Union. The race to control access to oil and gas resources is a
topic that will be addressed in this thesis, and in particular how the United States, China, and
Russia have fought to address their energy needs in the Caspian region.
The Soviet collapse resulted in the establishment of a number of newly independent
republics in Central Asia, loosely organized under the banner of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, which remained under Russian influence in the immediate aftermath of the
collapse. The switch from planned economies to free market capitalism was difficult.
International corporations and governments soon began to see potential in these new resource
rich countries. Energy corporations sought access to the potential extensive oil reserves in
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and huge gas potential in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Exxon,
Shell, (Russia’s) LukOil, and (Italy’s) Agip soon had specialists in the region to establish
prospects and potential contract rights. The rise in energy prices in the 2000s contributed to the
1

rapid intensification of land rights, project developments, and exploration activity in the region
by the United States, China, and Russia, resulting in massive profits. These three countries,
referred to in this thesis as the Big Three, all have elaborate stakes in the Central Asian region,
particularly in and around the Caspian Sea. The states of the Caspian region, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan (see Figure 1), all have

Figure 1: The States of the Caspian Region1
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experienced dramatically increased international focus and have faced unique development
consequences from this. The effects of this development have been unevenand, more recently,
fluctuating and unstable, especially since the onset of the very recent global economic downturn.
Russian author Alexander Dugin, who subscribes to a Russian-based neolibearlist
philosophy, feels that the collapse of the Soviet Union in no way should change the influence it
has over the Caspian states (Shlapentokh 2007). Current Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
has also stated repeatedly that Russia should remain the dominant power in the region. China,
with its rapidly growing economy has also made numerous agreements to gain access to the
resource rich region. While locating official Chinese documentation is near impossible, it is
evident that Central Asia will remain a major energy interest for the Chinese.
How the Big Three, and increasingly the EU, will continue to invest in the Caspian states
will hinge on two major issues: the ever-fluctuating prices of oil and natural gas, and secondly
the global economic crisis. The rapid downturn of the global economy, and of credit markets in
particular, have all impacted the Big Three to varying degrees. The US has experienced a wave
of financial collapses as dozens of banks and holding companies have failed, taken over by
others, or received government subsidies. The housing bubble burst, coupled with the Wall Street
collapses aided were the catalyst for the global credit crunch. The sudden drop in the price of oil
has also created another crisis in the Russian Federation. Russia had been riding the soaring
prices of oil to new heights since 2005. However, since the credit collapse in the second half of
2008, Russia was hit especially hard. The leading stock market, the RTS, has lost approximately
54% since July 2008 (Business Week, 2008). The Chinese economy has also slowed, although
much less so, as cutbacks in projects and bank failures have taken their toll. Perhaps the hardest
hit are the Caspian states.
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The general goal of this thesis is to improve understanding of hegemonic conflict and
uneven development in the energy resource-rich Caspian region. More specifically, the
objectives of the thesis are to: (1) to conceptually link Harvey’s (2006) theories of ‘accumulation
by dispossession’ and the ‘spatial fix’ to ‘hegemonic conflict’, a concept derived from the work
of Arrighi (2005), and (2) to examine how these linked concepts allows us to better understand
the uneven development of the Caspian states and the role played by the struggle between the
United States, Russia and China for access to oil and natural gas in the region.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the conceptual
framework of the study, based on the work of Harvey and Arrighi. Chapter 3 presents a general
overview of hegemonic conflict in the Caspian region. Chapter 4 provides a detailed description
of how hegemonic conflict has been played out in three strategically important states of the
Caspian region, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Chapter 5 provides a detailed
description of how hegemonic conflict has been played out in three energy rich states of the
Caspian region, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. Chapter 6 presents some
conclusions of the study.
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter summarizes the conceptual framework used in the study. The general
framework used here is Harvey’s conceptualization of uneven development, (Harvey, 2006).
Particular attention is given to two components of uneven development. The first is Harvey’s
concept of accumulation by dispossession, which he argues is a key component of uneven
development. The second draws upon Arrighi’s (2005) work on hegemonic conflict and the use
of the spatial fix by declining hegemonic powers, such as the US. The concrete context of the
study is the struggle for energy resources in the Caspian region.
Harvey (2006) argues that there are four conditionalities in a unified theory of uneven
development. These conditionalities are:
1. The material embedding of capital accumulation processes in the web of socio-ecological
life.
2. Accumulation by dispossession.
3. Accumulation in space in time.
4. Political, social, and class struggles at a variety of geographical scales.
The first conditionality argues that capital accumulation entails the commodification of
every aspect of daily life. Accumulation processes are therefore grounded in the space of
everyday life. These processes both work through and transform the social relations in society.
Capitalist activity is simultaneously in constant search of new arenas, while also being grounded
in space.
The second conditionality argues that accumulation by dispossession is a key process of
uneven development. Accumulation by dispossession goes beyond the traditional view of
accumulation as the appropriation of surplus of labor by capitalists (i.e. expanded reproduction),
5

to argue that accumulation also takes place through the dispossession of other people’s assets.
Harvey (2006) and Arrighi (2005) both argue that dispossession has been an increasingly
important form of accumulation during the neoliberal, globalization phase of capitalism since the
1980s. Dispossession itself can occur in many different forms. These range from outright
military action, to more covert operations like structural readjustment, or privatization. Harvey
also argues that uneven development through dispossession is critical for the stability of
capitalism. Finally, Harvey makes the case that it is the state which plays the dominant role in
enforcing accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003).
The third conditionality refers to the processes of accumulation which occur through
space and time. Accumulation results in spatial competition, the creation of a spatial division of
labor, the annihilation of space through time, the need to fix capital in space, the production of
scaled regions, the creation of alliances to protect the interests of the various parties who are
fixed in space, and attempts to resolve crises of overaccumulation by means of a spatial fix.
The fourth conditionality refers to the political, social, and class struggles over
accumulation at a variety of geographical scales. Such struggles can involve a wide range of
participants, from social movements to insurgent, ethnic, religious, and class-based groups.
These groups may be driven by either internal forces or by external forces. A good example of
this distinction in the case of the Caspian region are attempts by local groups to assert
sovereignty or independence in the new Caspian states and attempts by external forces (e.g. the
US) to manipulate local conditions to gain access to resources. For example, one could interpret
the so-called ‘Color Revolutions’ as attempts by citizens to create their own identities by
throwing off the stigmas of old regimes with the promise of change. However, Shlapentokh
quotes Russian political figure Dugin as interpreting these revolutions of just the opposite, that
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these were in fact regime changes brought on by the US and Europe to allow easier access to
regional assets (Shlapentokh 2008).
The second conceptual component of this research draws on the work of Arrighi (2005).
Arrighi argues that Harvey’s concept of the spatial fix is not simply a strategy used to overcome
crises of overaccumulation. It is also an aggressive strategy increasingly used by declining
hegemonic powers in conjunction with accumulation by dispossession, and one which results in
increasingly serious resistance. Arrighi demonstrates how the US’s search for a spatial fix has
caused significant ‘blowback’ in other parts of the world, as witnessed by the invasions of Iraq
and Afghanistan. The US’s military presence in South-Central Asia is a spatial fix to profit from
the world’s largest oil and gas reserves. Being a spatial fix, it involves a fixed, long-term
presence in the region, which has to be enforced by military occupation. Arrighi argues that the
US no longer has the economic strength to enforce the spatial fix, but must increasingly rely on
methods which result in worsening blowback. Russia does not want to see its former sphere of
influence challenged, and China is seeking to expand its influence in the region. The US
established diplomatic relations with all of the Caspian states immediately after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union in 1991, and it stepped up its interests in the region after 9/11. Russia has an
inherent interest in the region for both security and resource reasons, and its desire to keep other
powers out of their former empire is well known (The Economist, 2008). China’s economy has
been growing impressively over the past two decades, and its energy demand reflects this. With
the world’s largest population, and growing economy to match, the Chinese also have plenty to
gain by securing rights to the energy potential of the Caspian region.
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CHAPTER 3: A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF HEGEMONIC CONFLICT IN THE
CASPIAN REGION

The Caspian states themselves are comprised of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan. These states form a vast region of Asia, and sit atop
some of the world’s richest deposits of natural resources. The region has one of the longest, and
richest histories in recorded human history. Thought to have had human population as far back as
40,000 years2, the region has also been synonymous with struggle for its control. Civilizations
that have fought over this vast area include the Chinese, Mongol, Persian, Macedonian, Turkish,
and even Arab expansion. More recently, conflicts over independence were fought in the early
Imperial Russia, ultimately leading to Soviet rule by the mid-1920s. The region was also a target
during the “Great Game” period of European colonialism. However, after the Bolshevik
Revolution, the territory was officially into the new Soviet Union.
Under Soviet dominance, the Caspian states underwent numerous administrative
shakeups. The region was initially one large political district. The Turkestan Autonomous
Administrative Soviet Socialist Republic was founded on April 18, 1918, its capital Tashkent
with a population of five million. In 1924, the district was divided into five distinct republics:
Tajik ASSR, Turkmen SSR, Uzbek SSR, Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast, and Karakalpak
i

Autonomous Oblast. In 1926, the Kara-Kirghiz Oblast was divided under orders from Joseph

Stalin, becoming the Kirghiz SSR. In 1936, the Kazakh SSR was established, incorporating
regions from the Kirghiz SSR. Several other ethnic-based Soviet republics managed to escape
incorporation into larger republics. However, this would not last for long.
As a means of controlling potential ethnic conflict, the Soviet administration in Moscow
again redrew the political boundaries of the region, beginning in the late 1920s. This project was
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headed by then-Commissar of Nationalities, Joseph Stalin, to nationally delimit the Soviet
Union. The project began in 1922 and was completed in 1936. As a result, the Caspian States
were granted full autonomous status as members of the fifteen total constituent Soviet Socialist
Republics (SSRs). For reference, the SSRs in this discussion are the Kazakh SSR, Tajik SSR,
Kirgiz (also known Kyrgyz SSR), Uzbek SSR, and the Turkmen SSR. It should also be noted
that the Azerbaijan SSR will become important in later discussions.
The Caspian region is landlocked, mostly dominated by arid steppe, with several deserts,
as well as two major bodies of water: the Caspian and Aral Seas. In fact, Uzbekistan is one of
only two countries on Earth to be doubly-landlocked (the other being Liechtenstein). The region
experiences dramatic weather. Temperatures in winter dropping as far as -90 degrees Fahrenheit
are not unheard of, and can reach well into the 110s in the summer. Savanna grasslands mainly
dominate the steppe, although coniferous forests exist.
Soviet control of the region resulted in varying degrees of development. The Soviet Army
used ancient outposts and established bases throughout the region to quell potential religious
unrest. In addition, the political boundaries established cut through ancient ethnic lines.
However, due to the remoteness and rugged terrain, the republics were not as susceptible to
changing political climates in Moscow as other parts of the Soviet Union (e.g. the Ukraine, the
Baltic States, etc.). This made central economic planning that much more difficult for the
Kremlin. This had the unintended consequence of allowing the populations of these republics to
retain a far greater amount of traditional heritage and culture. However, Soviet leadership
mandated that each republic simultaneously retain its own history, but stress the importance of
the Soviet connection. Historians feel the greatest direct impact of Soviet rule in the Caspian
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states came in the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan3. The invasion and subsequent ten-year war had
a strong ripple effect on the region.
With Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika, the Soviet Union’s influence
started to decline. A rapid sequence of events began in 1990 with the declarations of
independence of the Baltic States. Deteriorating domestic political crises ultimately led to the
attempted coup in August 1991 and Gorbachev’s subsequent resignation essentially led to the
dissolving of the Soviet Union. Before Christmas of 1991, each autonomous republic of the
former USSR had declared its independence. The result was fifteen new countries comprising the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Each of the new republics of the CIS has dealt with its independence in various ways.
Some have reached out, and made attempts at allying themselves with the West. These include
Georgia the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), the Ukraine, and Moldova. The
Caspian states have pursued differing political agendas, each branching out in several different
paths. Those closer to China, like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have moved to a more Chinese
sphere of influence. Kazakhstan retains a major Russian influence, but has also experienced
interest from by US and Chinese. Others, like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s intentions remain
unclear. Their respective governments have both deftly manipulated and ostracized themselves
from major international interests. They are also home to some of the some of the worst
offenders of human rights in the world.
The geopolitics of this region has been dubbed “The Next Great Game” (Sandole 2007).
“Traditionally, this ‘game’ has been played between the British and Russian Empires, but now it
is primarily between the United States, Russia, and China. The US is pushing for democratic
transformation, which the Chinese and Russians view as antithetical to their goal of achieving
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and maintaining stability in the region” (Sandole 2007; Schmidle 2006; Weiss 2005; Zeigler
2007). Another factor to this is the potential “partnership” between Russia and China to keep the
US/NATO expansion out of the region.
It is here where the concept of accumulation by dispossession is useful in analyzing the
region. Each of the Big Three have varying degrees of investment in the energy reserves of the
region. Additionally, multinational energy corporations have established their own individual
presences in the region as well. Oil companies such as BP, Agip, Exxon, and Shell have all
closed lucrative contracts for oil rights in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (LeVine 2007; Stulberg
2007). Russian state-owned LukOil also has rights to Kazakh and Azeri oil fields in the Caspian
Sea (Stulberg 2007). Turkmenistan has allowed all three to explore gas reserves, as well as
granted German and British firms access as well. Kazakh-owned KazMunaiGas has also
purchased smaller, independent firms in March 20084. The Big Three have also proposed
numerous trade agreements with all states in the region (Bayulgen 2005). The United States has
recently ramped up efforts in Kyrgyzstan to keep the balance of power after its dismissal from an
Uzbek airbase due to criticism of the Andijan massacre in 2005. Central Asia is the most likely
area of potential confrontation between Russia and China, “especially Kirgizia (Kyrgyzstan) and
Kazakhstan, which will be the earliest target of the Russian-Chinese confrontation” (Shlapentokh
1995). Turkmenistan was invited by the United States to the April 2008 NATO summit in
Bucharest, where fellow CIS members Ukraine and Georgia were denied approval for
acceptance into the treaty bloc.
The Caspian region is a primary target in the search for the next global spatial fix. With
the increased demand for energy, it comes as no surprise that the Big Three have increased their
attention to the region, though it can be argued that Russia never stopped. These states are
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considered “weak” in terms of GDP and population living at or below the poverty line
(Tsygankov 2007). The key to the spatial fix in this area will be pipelines, and who controls
them. Pipelines are essential in energy reserve extraction. Landlocked and remote, the only
method of transportation of the energy reserves are networks of pipelines. It comes as no surprise
then, that the IMF gave $1.5 billion in startup investment fund to Kazakhstan in 1994, in
exchange for American and European oil businessmen to meet with both Russian and Kazakh
officials to open discussions over the exploration of the Tengiz oil field (LeVine 2007; 257-8).
Additionally, the World Bank was critical of oil firm Unocal’s business practices in negotiations
in Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan over natural gas pipelines. The World
Bank, on behalf of the US, Britain, and Russians, complained that Unocal was given preferred
treatment over rights to pipelines by manipulating local politicians and tribal leaders (LeVine,
2007, 297-98). The US also backed off previous denouncements of the human rights situation in
Turkmenistan. It has also strengthened ties in Kyrgyzstan to secure a military presence in the
region. A former US National Security Advisor declared the region “pivotal” to US interests, but
“other great powers too have been eager to expand their influence after the breakup of the Soviet
state” (Tsygankov 2007). The Chinese have recently announced major investment projects in
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Russia remains the main trade partner with both
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
These facts tie into Arrighi’s argument of hegemonic decline. He indicates that the
foreign policy of the United States, dictated by the ‘Project For a New American Century’, has
sought to establish a quasi-American empire. The US aims to do this by opening markets and
promoting the financialization of the US economy. Arrighi invokes Harvey’s theories of
overaccmuluation as a critical challenge which the US faces to this end. The current downturn in
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the US economy, resulting from the credit crisis, has now become a global problem. The
Russians also experienced an economic crisis in the late 1990s, which ultimately led to Yeltsin
resigning and turning the country over to Vladimir Putin in 1999. (Rasizade 2008). Much like the
‘Project For a New American Century’, which plays upon nationalism and the importance of an
American-dominated globe, Alexander Dugin is calling for the same in Russia. A Russian
intellectual and politician, Dugin has reestablished the concept of Eurasiansim, where Russia
becomes the dominant power in both Europe and Asia. The first step to this is reclaiming
political and economic control of Central Asia, and secondly, to keep Chinese and Indian
interests out (Shlapentokh 2007). The Chinese have no plans of easing their economic expansion,
however, although they are also experiencing the fallout of the global credit crunch. Their spatial
fix includes looking westward, and involves investments in the Caspian states (Tookey 2007).
Finally, it must be acknowledged that the Caspian states themselves have their own agendas and
goals which they wish to pursue, with or without global power assistance.
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CHAPTER 4: HEGEMONIC CONFLICT IN STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT
CASPIAN STATES

Since the early 1990s, the Big Three have sought to expand their hegemonic goals in
strategically important members of the Caspian states. These are the countries of Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. These three do not have the rich energy reserves of the other Caspian
states, but their location has made them important to the Big Three in their geopolitical goals.
Using the policy of the War on Terror and claiming to spread freedom across the globe, the US
has taken a very increased interest in the Caspian states. The invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan in October 2001 created a dire need of cooperation from the local states in Central
Asia. However, critical look at the increase of US attention to the region goes further back. The
United States sponsored, funded, and equipped many of the Islamic militants during the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. With the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, the US’s
geopolitical interest in Afghanistan waned. However, over the next eight years, Afghanistan
experienced a devastating civil war which resulted in the establishment of the Taliban rule in
1996. The United States was at least indirectly responsible for the creation of the Taliban, and
clearly responsible for the current situation. Since Afghanistan is landlocked, rugged, and
remote, needing other governments in the region to allow access to military bases, infrastructure,
and air space to conduct operations is essential.

Uzbekistan
While lacking the rich oil and gas reserves of its neighbors, Uzbekistan does have major
gold deposits, as well as being one of the world’s leading exporters of cotton. It is also an
extremely important country of strategic importance. Uzbekistan’s incredibly repressive
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government was responsible for the Andijan massacre in 2005. The government of President
Islam Karimov cracked down on growing political discontent across the country. The Uzbek
government has repeatedly stated that the crackdowns were to quell growing Islamic radicalism,
while critics argue that the government feared another potential “color revolution”, several of
which had occurred in the former USSR in the previous two years, including in neighboring
Kyrgyzstan. The Andijan massacre was the most infamous event during these crackdowns.
Government troops were attempting to break up a large crowd of demonstrators, when shots
were fired. Whether the military or protestors who shot first remains unknown and extremely
controversial, but estimated casualties range from government figures of nine5 to the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights over 6006.
The United States State Department diplomatic reaction was very critical, suggesting that
the incident may have been the result of terrorist actions, while Russia and China supported the
Uzbek response. After pressure from a bipartisan group of US senators who wanted to open
United Nations investigations and inquiries, the State Department considered cutting diplomatic
ties. The US Department of Defense, specifically Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, suggested a more
tempered response, but the damage was done. This sparked a major shift in Uzbek foreign
policy, which was mostly neutral, to a much more pro-Russian stance. As a result of the US’s
condemning of the events, Karimov revoked the US’s lease of the Karshi-Khanabad airbase7.
This left the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan as the only remaining base with US forces in the
region. However, in March 2008, the US backtracked on its previous denouncements. The result
was Uzbekistan readmitting US use of the airbase.
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The Uzbek government has since strengthened economic and diplomatic ties with Russia
and China, showing evidence of the shifting hegemonic contradictions in this region. To counter
this, the US stepped up ties in Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan was largely ignored by Moscow throughout its years as a Soviet republic, and
remained so after independence. The US, however, did give hundreds of millions of dollars in
aid with the Freedom Support Act passing in 1992. The US and China also helped develop
Kyrgyzstan’s vast potential hydroelectrical energy. The Tulip Revolution became the third, and
currently most recent, of the color revolutions has drastically altered how the Big Three have
approached the country. Kyrgyzstan has since become a major wild card in the region. Despite
not possessing significant quantities of mineral wealth, its strategic importance makes it a pivotal
target for the Big Three’s hegemonic conflict.
President Askar Aliyev had reached his term limit in 2005. However, his son and
daughter were both in countrywide elections for parliamentarian positions, scheduled for March
13. This sparked unease, as Kyrgyz citizens feared a dynastic government forming. Both children
won their seats, in addition to widespread reports of voter fraud. Demonstrations and civil unrest
broke out in southern cities, notably Osh, eventually spreading nationwide. Military and police
attempted to quell the demonstrations, but this only added to the fervor as rival political
leadership joined. Aliyev stated he would not step down, nor discuss the situation with the
protestor’s leadership. By March 21, opposition political leader Roza Otunbaeva, herself a
former prime minister, stated that police and military were defecting in massive numbers8. Three
days later, the protests reached the capital of Bishkek, and the opposition party became unified
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with former prime minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Otunbaeva the leaders. The same day,
Aliyev and his family fled to Kazakhstan and then to Moscow, where he again refused to resign.
As more protestors seized control of key political and military buildings and posts, political
prisoners were freed. The Kyrgyz Supreme Court declared the election results invalid, and
named Bakyiev acting president and prime minister. Clashes between pro-Aliyev supporters
couple with some remaining government forces and the protestors caused many causalities while
the new political leadership appealed for calm across the country. By March 28, relative peace
had been reached across the country, with the previous parliament being dissolved and a new one
established. Aliyev agreed to resign, formally stepping down on April 5. His resignation was
adopted by the new Kyrgyz leadership six days later after debate on how he and his family’s
political powers should be dealt with, since the previous parliament had given them many
privileges. One condition of his resignation was the forfeiture and stripping of all said privileges.
The revolution was officially over when Bakyiev won a landslide in elections held in July.
Bakyiev appointed Felix Kulov, a leading opponent of Aliyev and former political prisoner freed
during the revolt, as prime minister.
Immediately after the revolution was over, reports that the United States had influenced
the events began to surface. Money from the US from the Freedom Support Act, in addition to
funds from other government-financed institution such as Freedom House and National
Endowment for Democracy, Kyrgyz opposition leaders stated was essential in the regime
change9. Aliyev also suggested that the West had been actively trying to foment political and
societal unrest. In addition, the Manas airbase, run by the US military since December 2001, did
not report a single incident or interrupt during the entire revolution. Kyrgyzstan was clearly
moving closer towards the US. However, within a year, these relations became strained. The
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political mood across the country had begun to darken, as the Bakyiev administration had begun
to be accused of many of the same offenses Aliyev had done. These included nepotism, lack of
developing infrastructure, disappearance of aid funding, rise in organized crime, and widespread
corruption. In addition, the country became a major shipping route for opium grown in
Afghanistan to other Central Asian countries. This resulted in a significant rise in violence and
further corruption, especially in the south of the country. The situation reached a violent peak in
summer 2006 when protests erupted in Bishkek resulting in the deaths of several
parliamentarians. Bakyiev responded by saying political opponents were attempting a coup.
Protests again broke out in mid-April 2007 in and around Bishkek over the worsening
corruption, mafia violence, and narcotics problems. Government forces eventually broke up the
demonstrations10.
The protests and violence caused a rift to develop between Bakyiev and the United
States, and the Manas airbase became a focal point of controversy. Bakyiev threatened to close
the base if the US did not pay more for troops to be stationed there. In December 2006, a US Air
Force serviceman shot and killed a Kyrgyz truck driver waiting at a checkpoint. The US military
has repeatedly stated the driver brandished a knife and the serviceman used deadly force in selfdefense. The Kyrgyz government and public were outraged and pushed for the immunity of the
serviceman be lifted. The US military stated the serviceman would be retained on base until the
matter was resolved, but it was later shown that he was evacuated despite the initial statements11.
Bakyiev eventually stated on February 3, 2009 that the base would close, adding that economic
considerations and negative public opinion of the US presence were part of the decision12.
With the shift away from the US, Kyrgyzstan announced it would be establishing a new
joint economic partnership with Russia, and would be receiving $2 billion in loans and another
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$150 million in aid. Kyrgyzstan has also continued to strengthen its ties with China. The two
have long had an energy partnership and in August 2007 signed a joint economic, military, and
trade partnership. China had supported the Kyrgyz government’s responses to the protests and
demonstrations in 2006 and 200713. From the vantage points of the Russians and Chinese, the
renewed interest in Kyrgyzstan has be to seen a victory in taking a political and economic ally
from the United States. From Kyrgyzstan’s, they are receiving more aid and ties with powerful
local powers. The US’s hegemonic accumulation by dispossession by keeping Kyrgyzstan close,
especially with its strategic importance to Afghanistan as well as keeping China and Russia in
check may have backfired by attempted to push a local government further than they wanted.
The US may have been surprised by the opposition of a one-time ally.

Tajikistan
Tajikistan also continues to suffer from decades of neglect from the international
community. The country was largely forgotten in the Soviet Union. Its rugged terrain,
remoteness, and lack of exploitable mineral resources kept most Soviet-style development from
ever reaching most of the country. The Soviets were able to do was pit the ethnic Tajiks against
the Uzbeks in the republic. This would lay the foundation for much of the problems the country
would face in the future. The collapse of the Soviet Union also ended whatever capital that was
incoming from Moscow. Tajikistan’s ethnic tensions rose quickly and civil unrest became
widespread. Despite its lack of resources available for export, Tajikistan, like its neighbors, did
have strategic importance in the region. The US’s hegemonic goals saw the US supporting and
funding the anti-government forces. The resulting civil war wracked the country.
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The war began in the spring of 1992 when protests against the disputed presidential
elections escalated into armed combat. President Rahmon Nabiyev and other high ranking
government members disbursed weaponry and munitions to pro-government supporters and
militias. Opposition parties and protestors acquired weaponry from Afghan warlords. The war
itself was ethnic and regionally fueled, the Leninabadi and Kulyab against the Parmiris. The
United States armed and supported several groups of the anti-government forces in ways similar
to their support of the mujahideen during the Afghan civil war. Russia and Uzbekistan continued
to fund and support the pro-government forces. The pro-government forces routed the opposition
forces in the early stages of the conflict. The peak of the conflict reached its height between
1992-93, where the Kulyabi forces continued its military successes on the battlefield, and then
began engaging in ethnic cleansing of opposing ethnic groups14. Mass killings, targeting of
political figures, burning of villages, and the expulsion of rivalry groups were widespread in the
south of the country. Tens of thousands of refugees fled to Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Over the
next several years, the opposition groups themselves fled into Afghanistan to recoup and
reorganize. By now, Russian and Uzbek military forces were actively engaged in the war, which
was increasingly becoming a stalemate for all sides. The breakdown in society, especially in the
south, paired with foreign intervention fighting foreign Islamic militants stalled any real
progress. By mid-1997, Tajikistan was in complete devastation and all sides had begun
negotiating. Peace accords were signed in July 1997, ending the civil war. At least 50,000 were
killed, and over 1.2 million were displaced15.
The Tajik civil war represented the worst kind of hegemonic accumulation by
dispossession. Both the United States and Russia played roles in a foreign civil conflict to benefit
themselves in some way. That the United States was attempting to further destabilize a former
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Communist regime with no tangible threat further shows the contradiction in hegemonic foreign
policy. More recently, the Pentagon announced a new deal in early 2009 to promote economic
development and help rebuild infrastructure. The civil war wrecked most of the country, and
reconstruction has still been hampered in rural areas. Tajikistan also suffered from one of the
harshest winters in history in 2007-08. Food shortages and widespread energy problems created
further instability. Tajikistan’s social and economic issues have given rise to a major increase in
militant Islam and the country is a major shipping point for Afghan opium. The US’s recent
interest in the country was summed up as to “prevent the rise of another Afghanistan”
(http://eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav031609.shtml). The US wishes to keep
Tajikistan relatively stable to maintain another local ally in a region they have few of. The
strategic importance of Tajikistan makes it desirable to the US. Unfortunately, the civil war and
subsequent years of underdevelopment have reduced it to a quasi-narco state, along with a
strengthening of radical Muslim activity. Tajikistan accounts for 58% of opium seizures in all of
the Caspian states as well as almost a third of heroin seizures16 (see Figure 2).
The Chinese continue to invest capital in Tajikistan much in the way they have in
Kyrgyzstan. Cheaper Chinese commodities are widespread in Kyrgyzstan, and have begun to
appear in Tajikistan as well. Talks of a Chinese-funded hydroelectrical project in Tajik territory
are also underway. The project would continue the construction of a dam which began as a
Soviet project in 1976 and has only seen sporadic continuity since17. This would be the second
Chinese-built dam in Tajikistan in two years18. Chinese investment may allow closer ties
between the two. The results of foreign hegemonic interference will continue to add to the
uneven development of the country for the foreseeable future.
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Figure 2: Afghan Poppy Trade Routes19
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CHAPTER 5: HEGEMONIC CONFLICT IN ENERGY RICH CASPIAN STATES
This thesis will now move away from the geographically strategic states of the Caspian
region and examine the uneven development implications of hegemonic conflict in the energy
rich nations of the region, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. These three have access to
some of the richest reserves of energy resources in the world. The Big Three all have a vested
interest in the development of each. The United States and China both have made major steps to
procuring not just the drilling rights for the oil and natural gas, but also access to pipelines to get
the resources to market.

Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan is an unknown in the Caspian states. From independence up until
December 2006, the natural gas rich state was ruled by Saparmurat Niyazov. Autocratic and
reclusive Niyazov established a Stalinesque cult of personality. Shortly after Turkmenistan’s
independence in 1992, Niyazov was elected president (the only candidate on the ballot) and
dubbed himself “Turkmenbashi”, literally “Leader of Turkmen.” In 1994, the Parliament
extended him a 10-year term, and in 2002, declared him president for life.
The end of the communist system provided Niyazov the opportunity to promote his own
image. His book, Ruhnama, became required reading in Turkmen schools. It promoted Turkmen
culture and taught to reject international culture. It also established new holidays, many of which
named after Turkmenbashi or members of his family. He actively promoted his cult of
personality by erecting thousands of pictures and monuments to himself. The most notable of
these is the solid gold, life-size statue of him located in the central square of Ashgabat which
rotated to face the sun throughout the day. He amassed an estimated total wealth of $3 billion at
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the time of his death, most “appropriated” from public funds20. Opposition parties were outlawed
even before he was elected president. Public playing of music, opera, and theater were outlawed
in the early 2000s. He sought several Soviet-style centrally planned economic development
projects to jumpstart the economy, despite his suggestions that the country needed to move
towards a free market economy.
During his reign, Turkmenistan did develop large scale industrial plants, drilling, and
machinery to tap into the lucrative gas and oil reserves. Turkmenistan possesses the world’s fifth
highest gas reserves, and second most in the former Soviet Union21. It also lays claim to the fifth
largest natural gas field in the world, which was verified by British geologists in 200822. Access
to these reserves to other countries and international corporations kept the country from
becoming completely isolated and ignored from the rest of the world. Niyazov did establish a
permanent state of neutrality for Turkmenistan, which is recognized by the UN. He was able to
play hegemonic powers off each other, sometimes with frustrating ease. Relations with Russia
soured almost immediately after independence, especially after Niyazov supported the attempted
coup in 1991. However, as time progressed, Russia was able to sway Turkmen gas exports and
access rights towards themselves. This occurred because in the mid-90s the price of natural gas
dropped significantly, and Turkmen capital began running out. Ashgabat began to seek interest
in foreign investment, and Russia was willing to listen. Russia was then able to shift policy to
their benefit, such as denying Turkmenistan access to pipelines to sell their gas to Europe. This
remains a major point of contention in the region. Niyazov felt that the Russians had “robbed”
his country, forcing him to accept prices 40-60% lower than he sought as well as having to pay
not only access to pipelines, but also for equipment and services which rarely arrived on
schedule or met quality specifications (Stulberg 2007).
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Turkmenistan’s options were hardly limited. The US-backed Trans-Caspian Pipeline
(TCP), which would run from Turkey through Azerbaijan, throughout Turkmenistan, and
reaching Pakistan has been scheduled for construction for over a decade. The route would bypass
both Russia and Iran and offer Turkmenistan a prime outlet to European markets. However, after
continued delays and logistical hang-ups, Niyazov’s interest waned. Other potential pipelines
included a route to Pakistan and India, as well as a Chinese-Japanese route. Despite progress
made in every project, Ashgabat stepped back from each. Despite early indications that
Turkmenistan was abandoning Russian regional control after independence, Western capitalist
investors were increasingly frustrated with the seemingly contradictory stances Niyazov
continued to pursue.
By the end of the century, and even though gas revenues were rising rapidly,
Turkmenistan’s strategic options continued to deteriorate. Russia had managed to hedge off
potential markets by preempting gas sales to Europe by selling their own or buying it from other
countries and reselling it. Years of impasse with Western developers kept US interest cautious at
best. The Chinese expressed some interest, but progress was slow. To reach European markets,
Ashgabat had to offer major concessions, as well as promising high volumes for delivery at
cheap rates. Russia had managed to keep access to pipelines to every market in the region,
including Turkey and Iran, out of Turkmen hands. This also kept future pipeline development in
their favor by restricting access to and, in some cases, land rights. Russia eliminated many of
Turkmenistan’s demands, forcing Niyazov into further concessions. A key shift for Niyazov
occurred in 2000-2001 when the price of gas skyrocketed from historic lows in the 1990s.
Encircled by Russian influence, and fed up with potential Western investment, Niyazov began
making extravagant demands to the Russians for their purchase of Turkmen gas. However, this
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was mostly grandstanding, and he was forced to make numerous concessions, including
accepting only half payment in 2007 on potentially 2 trillion cubic meters of gas (Stulberg 2007).
Perhaps the largest concession was the delimiting of access in the Caspian Sea. Niyazov was
extremely careful to consult with Vladimir Putin before making any potential moves. Putin
rejected Niyazov several times over issues such as off-sea drilling and establishing a Caspian Sea
gas consortium. These shifts in policy represented a clear shift from Niyazov over such matters.
Niyazov’s death on December 21, 2006 created a potential for major change in
Turkmenistan. Turkmenbashi’s personal doctor, little-known Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow was
appointed interim president on December 26, and won the presidential election in February 2007.
He immediately promised to offer reform and deconstruct Niyazov’s personality cult. He quickly
moved to reopen public theater and arts and sports, as well as establish the country’s first internet
café. He also ended the long musical and dance-filled pageants that opened and closed every
official presidential meeting or visit. He also allowed non-ethnic Turkmens to return to work at
posts where Niyazov had previously fired them. He reversed one of Niyazov’s least popular
moves by reestablishing pension funds for nearly 100,000 retired people. He has also changed
calendar names back to their originals, and outlawed the right to rename places, monuments, and
institutions after the president. He has said the gold statue in Ashgabat will be moved to a new
location, though its ultimate destination is still unknown.
The change in leadership has also brought new developments to how the Big Three
interact with Turkmenistan. Then-Russian president Vladimir Putin immediately held a summit
the new president, while then- US Vice President Dick Cheney traveled to Ashgabat too.
Western investors were also emboldened by the potential to finally reach terms to rights to drill
or transport gas under a new regime. However, whatever optimism they may have had
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disappeared as no real progress was made through 2007. In 2008, at a summit to discuss further
gas and oil developments, officials left disappointed, some frustrated by the apparent lack of
cooperation from the Turkmen. The Turkmen officials refused to even refer to the potential
Nabucco pipeline by name. The Nabucco pipeline is a planned pipeline stretching from Central
Europe to Turkey, bypassing both Iran and Russia (see Figure 3). It would then link up with the
planned Trans-Caspian pipeline. It is seen by the European and American governments as the
most viable for reaching Turkmen gas. However, the reluctance of Turkmen officials to even
acknowledge it by name left many confused and angry23. In addition, Russia had delayed the
building of a gas pipelines to China the month before24. As such, it appears that Russia will
continue to dictate how much of an influence Turkmenistan can exercise over the exporting of its
gas reserves.

Figure 3: The Nabucco Pipeline25
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Since the mid-1990s, the Russians have managed to almost completely choke off most
potential outside investment of Turkmenistan. Because of their rich gas reserves, the Turkmen
government established that the easiest way to economic development was exploiting these.
However, after the Russians managed to keep the gas from reaching European markets by
restricting access to the network of pipelines in the Caspian states, the Russians were able to
dictate how much gas Turkmenistan could export. The Russians were also able to force Ashgabat
to sell their gas to them at bargain basement prices, a clear example of accumulation by
dispossession with implications for the uneven development of the country.

Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan experienced hegemonic influence earlier than any other country in the region.
The history of foreign investment goes back to the 1870s. For centuries in and around the capital
of Baku, residents were able to simply dig a hole in their yard and oil would rise to the surface. It
was that rich and plentiful. Russia had long dominated the region. However, due to the vast oil
reserves, foreign dollars and citizens flocked to Baku, creating a diverse and contemporary city.
Many local residents became very wealthy in the oil business, and established a close-knit
collection of barons who would in turn run the city. The richest and most well known of the local
oil barons was Zeynalabdin Tagiyev. He made himself a fortune in the oil business, and was
responsible for much of the construction of Baku (LeVine 2007).
Azerbaijan also had a tumultuous underlying tension between the country’s two ethnic
groups: the Muslim Azeris and the Christian Armenians. Most of the Armenian population lives
in the exclave Nagorno-Karabakh, which is surrounded entirely by the country of Azerbaijan.
This underlying tension became full blown violence in the early twentieth century, sparked by
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labor strikes in attempts to cause uprisings in Russia. “Armenians were part of the wealthy
establishment…native Azeris, often far less educated, filled many of the jobs in the oil fields,
railroad yards, and factories” (LeVine 2007). One of the leaders of the Baku strikes was a young
Josef Stalin. Militias attacked oil facilities and refineries under the direction of czarist ministers,
hoping to spread confusion among the striking laborers and have them turn on each other.
Instead, it only worsened the ethnic tensions. During the 1905 revolution in Russia, Lenin sent
lieutenants to lead uprisings in Baku. Czarist authorities did not intervene, and Muslim Azeris
massacred local Armenians. Riots raged all over Baku, homes of Armenians burned to the
ground, often with the residents prevented from, or shot while, escaping. The violence further
spread to the oil fields, resulting in the destruction of many oil facilities. Even over a decade later
during the Russian Revolution, Armenian Bolsheviks proved vital in the eventual Red victory in
Azerbaijan. Throughout the Russian Civil War, Azeri-Armenian ethnic clashes occurred
consistently, with high casualty rates on both sides.
The ethnic strife in the country understandably worried the European and American
oilmen. Some believed the Soviet revolution would ultimately sputter, while others had already
begun talking of leaving. Initially, local oil barons believed the uprising would fail, but
increasingly began to flee. With the Bolshevik victory, those who stayed became targets of
communist retribution. Most of those who fled went to Constantinople or Paris. The result was
an oil industry that had fallen into complete collapse. Soviet domination of the region left outside
investment untenable. However, when production reached historic lows (13% of pre-WWI
levels26), Lenin had no choice but to seek foreign investment. His New Economic Plan offered
small companies to opportunity to privatize. Despite the US trade embargo on Soviet Russia,
Lenin was nonetheless able to attract investment interest from European as well as US industries.

29

US teams were eventually able to secure numerous contracts and the rights to drill. The Soviet
Union was able to negotiate contracts that promised hundreds of millions of dollars in investment
fees and even more in loans. One particular contract stated that in exchange for Sinclair Oil
access to Baku, Grozny, and a monopoly of the Siberian island of Sakhalin, the US would have
to diplomatically recognize the USSR (LeVine 2007). However, after Lenin’s death in 1924,
Stalin voided all previously established contracts. Stalin would later employ American and
European consultants and engineers to help construct huge industrial projects. However, the
foreign personnel were hired help, not as profit-earning co-owners. Baku’s oil fields were
producing 100 billion barrels by 1930, third highest in the world27.
World War II saw the production in Baku slow significantly, as Hitler drove toward the
city to capture the fields. Stalin ordered many of the oil well plugged in the event the Nazis
reached their destination. After the defeat of Germany, the oil industry soon found the concrete
used in plugging the wells ruined many of them. In addition, pumping methods and technology
was old and deteriorating. For a time, it appeared Baku would instead become the focus of Soviet
refining, until the Soviets began to drill in the Caspian Sea itself. The Soviets dubbed the first
off-shore drilling platform “Oily Rocks”, and it became a national attraction. However, drilling
in the Caspian proved to be far more difficult than Soviet engineers had anticipated, and the
results were underwhelming. The Soviets had already located huge reserves in the Volga River
basin and in Siberia and turned most of their attention there.
Production in Azerbaijan continued unabated and without little-to-no foreign investment
until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Azeri SSR president Heydar Aliyev, whom had been the
first Azeri in the Soviet Politburo, had returned to Azerbaijan. He had been removed from office
by Mikhail Gorbachev on corruption charges in 1987, but remained in Moscow until 1990.
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Aliyev had denounced the Communist Party and returned home, reinventing himself as a
nationalist. He was elected to the Azeri parliament that year. The Azeri-Armenian war had been
fought since 1988. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused the violence to surge.
Aliyev, who had negotiated a peace treaty between Armenia and his semi-autonomous region of
Nakhchivan, was invited to Baku to help with a coup which ultimately led to the overthrow of
the Azeri government. Aliyev was able to seize power himself, elected president in October
1993. He immediately sought to end the war, but could not, and was later forced to concede the
Nagorno-Karabakh region to Armenian control. He also reopened the oil fields for foreign
investment.
Russia immediately claimed they had the rights to the fields since they were discovered
and developed during the Soviet era (LeVine 2007). Attempts by the US to expedite the
impending deals with several multinationals were met very coolly by their Russian counterparts.
In addition, Aliyev himself may have been wavering, since the US was not interested in helping
the peace process over the Nagorno-Karabakh war. A proposed plan that offered a 40% stake of
the three biggest Azeri oil fields to the US companies was abruptly scuttled by the Azerbaijanis,
and months passed without further talks. After months of tense negotiations between the oil
companies and Aliyev, the so-called “Deal of the Century” was signed on September 20, 1994.
The Russians declared they did not recognize the deal even before the parties had left the palace.
Aliyev asked US President Bill Clinton to talk to Boris Yeltsin to be flexible, but the Russian had
shifted their interests to the pipelines the oil flowed through.
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Figure 4: Baku Pipelines, Current and Proposed (The BTC is in green)28

Azerbaijan now dealt with the transportation of the oil out of the country. It had three
viable options. The first was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline which had great
risk/reward potential (see Figure 4). If it was successful, it would break Russia’s pipeline
monopoly, cement political support from Georgia, Turkey, and the United States, and open
markets in Western Europe. Conversely, retaliation from Moscow would be guaranteed, and the
pipeline would be open to Armenian and Kurdish sabotage which would cause fees to escalate
(Stulberg 2007). The second option involved refurbishing the Baku-Suspa pipeline, which runs
from Baku to Georgia’s Black Sea coast. This would be the cheapest option, as well as the
shortest. It would also open up Western European markets, all while bypassing Russian territory.
However, it would receive tepid endorsement from the US and Turkey. Worse, neither country
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would offer security guarantees, while at the same time antagonizing Russia. The pipeline would
also run through at least four potential conflict zones in the Caucasus.
The third option was utilizing Russian controlled pipelines to the north and into Europe.
Its advantages were keeping Russia pleased as well as offering Baku the opportunity to ship high
volumes of oil early with the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. The disadvantage to this option was
provoking both Turkey and the US, as well as raising costs of transportation. “Some compared
the events that would follow with the Great Game between Britain and imperial Russia…this
time, the US, Britain, and Turkey would be pitted against Russia and Iran” (LeVine 2007). The
US developed a plan with two parts. The first involved a massive expansion of NATO, stopping
at Ukraine and Belarus, and secondly, the Caspian states would have control of their lands, free
of Russian influence. Ultimately, it took until 2002 for Azerbaijan to select the BTC pipeline
option. Due to years of negotiations, talks, cancelled plans, and other hold-ups, Azerbaijan was
able to defy the Russians. Internal politics and rivalries inside Russia caused enough problems on
their own to weaken Russia long enough for Azerbaijan to proceed with the BTC project.
Azerbaijan is an excellent example of accumulation by dispossession and hegemonic
conflict in the Caspian region. The country has long seen foreign investment in its oil reserves,
but since the end of the Soviet Union it has become a site of constant conflict between major
powers. The US and Russia have been locked against each other for the oil there since 1991. The
struggle for pipelines is again a classic example of this. Whoever controls the pipelines can
dictate the policy of Azerbaijan as well, an argument which extends all the Caspian states.
Hegemonic foreign policy has had a considerable impact on the uneven development of this
country.
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Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has experienced the most significant development since the end of the USSR.
It has the largest territory and, more importantly, vast amounts of mineral and energy resources,
by far the largest among the Caspian states. This has translated into a continuous hegemonic
struggle for energy access for all of the Big Three since 1991. Kazakhstan was the last of the
Soviet Republics to declare independence. The president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has been in
office since independence, and was also the chairman of the Kazakh SSR before the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Nazarbayev has helped further the foreign investment into Kazakhstan, and is
known for his personal handling of energy issues. He has made it a point of emphasis to expand
the oil industry as much as possible, and to open it to as much foreign investment as possible. He
has made it a goal to move Kazakhstan into the top-50 GDP producing countries in the world
(LeVine 2007). As of 2009, Kazakhstan’s GDP ranked 56th in the world29.
However, he is not without his share of criticism. He has been linked to numerous
corruption charges, the most notable being “Kazakhgate”. Nazarbayev had accepted almost $80
million in bribes from American oil advisor Jim Giffen, which led to Giffen’s arrest in 2003. The
deal centered around Giffen, representing several Western oil companies, paying the Kazakh
president and several other top aides into securing rights to the Kashagan oil field. Nazarbayev
has also been accused of framing political opponents, including the arrest and exile of his son-inlaw. Additionally, in 2006, two of his top political rivals were found dead in separate incidents.
None of this had mattered to the capitalists who have sought the country’s resources.
Kazakhstan had been an oil producer during the Soviet era, but not nearly as important as
Azerbaijan or the Siberian fields. The discovery of the Tengiz oil field in 1979 on the
northwestern shores of the Caspian offered a massive opportunity for international investment. In
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the years leading up to and after the Soviet collapse, major debate raged over how and who
would be granted access to as well as the shipping rights to the field. The field itself had proven
extremely difficult to drill as pockets of hydrogen sulfide gas, dubbed “sour gas”, lay above the
oil bed. Sour gas is “one of the most insidious naturally occurring substances on the planet,
destroying one’s sense of smell before rapidly paralyzing or killing its victim” (LeVine 2007).
This gas is also known to dissolve steel.
The Soviets had explored the option of allowing Western oil companies access to drilling,
as Chevron had developed a method of containing the sour gas, but each attempt at this was
ultimately voided by the Russians. American interest in the region was always resisted. The CIA
reported that Tengiz had an estimated 18 billion barrels of oil, and was critical to future Soviet
energy needs (ibid.). In addition, the North Caspian itself had the potential of 50 billion barrels
(ibid.). It appeared for a while that Chevron, which had courted Soviet officials, would be
granted the right to Tengiz. However, BP was working with the Kazakh government, hoping to
reach a deal of their own. BP hedged its bets on Nazarbayev. Eventually, Chevron and the Soviet
government forced BP to step down, as the Russians promised that even if they drill in Tengiz,
BP would never receive Soviet help in transportation. Nazarbayev was understandably
disappointed, but knew Tengiz was the key to distancing Kazakhstan from Moscow. He did not
have to wait long. In October 1990, the Kazakh parliament, following leads from the other Soviet
republics, declared itself independent. By the end of the following year, the USSR had been
dissolved. Tengiz was immediately reopened to foreign investment. The next two years involved
negotiations between the US, European countries and oil businesses, as well as Russian and
Chinese interest. The final deal, signed in April 1993 divided Tengiz among Chevron (50%),
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ExxonMobil (25%), Kazakhstan’s state-own KazMunayGas (20%), and Russia’s
LukArco(5%)30.
The deal exposed the pipeline issue. For decades, Kazakhstan had exported its oil through
an aging Soviet network. The new deal would require a new pipeline system. Chevron was
hesitant, and Kazakhstan lacked the capital to build it themselves. Russia became an immovable
object in the construction negotiations, saying whatever territorial offers were made as
insufficient. Rounds of tense and frustrating talks ensued over the next several years. Every time
a deal seemed to be within reach, another issue would arise. By 1996, a deal had finally been
reached, and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (also called the Tengiz Pipeline Consortium) was
reestablished. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium was initially created in 1992, but after the years
of delays, was restructured to include all of the parties. The deal involved eight different oil
companies from the US, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Russia. The pipeline began
operations in 2001.
The Kashagan oil field was a potential blockbuster, and was first noticed by the Soviets
(see Figure 5). In 1990, BP was allowed to begin initial studies of the Soviet data, which
suggested a massive geological structure under the Caspian Sea. Seismic mapping was
completed in 1997, and by then the consortium interested in drilling the potential field had grown
to nine corporations from four different nations: the US, France, Britain, and Japan. The oil field
was projected to have 15 billion barrels of crude, possibly more. Drilling in the north Caspian is
difficult and unique (see Figure 6). Some areas of sea were just ten feet deep above the
Kashagan, and ice flows were common during winter. This proved to be one of many problems
that delayed the drilling process. Construction on the oil platform ran over a year behind
schedule, but in July 1999 it was put online despite not being completed yet. Drilling took over a
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year to progress through the salt dome over the potential oil, and tensions among the Kazakhstani
government and the consortium rose. However, as the drilling went deeper, it meant the
possibility of a massive find.

Figure 5: The Kashagan Oil Field31

The evidence of the potential of Kashagan meant another series of pipelines would be
needed to carry the oil. The US wanted a network to stretch from Baku to Ceyhan, Turkey,
which would later become the BTC pipeline. The US’s goals were clear: “The pipeline could be
routed so as to skirt not only Russia, but also Iran…America and its allies could collect a huge
energy dividend” (LeVine 2007).

37

Figure 6: The Site of the Kashagan Oil Field32

This created infighting among the oil companies, who wished to pursue a shorter pipeline
through Iran to the Persian Gulf, and the US who refused to allow Iran any access. In the end, the
US government won. Gradually, the oil companies began to agree to concessions. Several of the
Caspian states agreed to the conditions of construction. On November 18, 1999, the governments
of the US, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Kazakhstan signed documents to begin the
pipeline’s construction. Russia immediately expressed its displeasure with the events, saying
both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan should use existing Russian infrastructure rather than a network
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that doesn’t yet exist. Not to be outdone, the Chinese signed an agreement of their own with
Kazakhstan for construction of their own pipeline in 1997 (see Figure 7). The pipeline would be
built in three separate stages, the first section completed in 2005. The final phase of construction
is expected to be finished in 201133.

Figure 7: The Kazakh-Chinese Oil Pipeline34

Development of the Kashagan oil field has been wrought with problems and delays. The
difficultly of drilling the Caspian has proven to be an effective means of drastically altering the
field’s development. The Kazakh government has also slowed progress. The Kazakh government
bought approximately $1.2 billion worth of BP’s stake in the field in 2003, after BP attempted to
sell their entire stake to two Chinese oil companies. In 2007, the government halted development
of the field, citing environmental concerns, and suspended Italian Agip’s contract. After
discussions, development was restarted, and Agip was allowed back into the country35.
Currently, the field is projected to begin full operations in 2014.
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The impact of energy development in Kazakhstan has been considerable. The
government unleashed a massive series of spending initiatives with the incoming stream of oil
revenue. Western-style stores and restaurants opened in the capital of Alma-Ata. Nazarbayev’s
most daring move came in 1997, when he moved the capital from Alma-Ata to a town in northcentral Kazakhstan named Aqmola. Aqmola was renamed Astana, literally “Capital”. The move
was Nazarbayev’s attempt to establish a city of his own, modern and expansive. The move was
controversial, as the new capital lay in a remote part of the Kazakh steppe where weather was
unpredictable and extreme. The city’s development was explicitly funded from the oil revenue.
The city’s population has more than doubled since the move, to 600,00036. The capital spent on
the construction of Nazarbayev’s project often did not make it to the residents of the city.
Poverty still was widespread, and continues to be, especially with the financial collapse. The
rapid spending, the worldwide drop in energy prices, and the credit crisis resulted in bank
failures across the country. The worldwide credit crisis has hit Kazakhstan particularly hard.
The Kazakhstani government has taken over 25% stake in each of the country’s four largest
banks37. In addition, international energy companies have been easing interests in the country.
BG and Eni of Italy each have expressed interest in restructuring contracts over the rights to the
Karachaganak gas field.
Simultaneously, Kazakhstan has pursued increased cooperation with the United States
economically and militarily. Then Vice-President Dick Cheney visited the country in 2006 “to
shore up relations with the leader of a country that within a decade was expected to be exporting
more than two million barrels of oil a day” (LeVine 2007). Cheney chose not to comment on the
human rights record of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has also signed strategic partnerships pacts with
the US38.
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Kazakhstan is another example of the interrelationship between hegemonic conflict,
accumulation by dispossession and uneven development. The Tengiz and Kashagan fields are
two of the world’s largest oil fields. The actions of the US and Russia in this country gives clear
evidence of how these countries plan to pursue their hegemonic goals through energy policy. The
Chinese, meanwhile, continue to act more subtlety but have themselves pursued a similar
agenda. All three have maneuvered to keep the others out, and all three have employed a policy
of dispossession. The consequence has been uneven development. Kazakhstan had been unafraid
to secure the best deals possible, and was not afraid to act independently and antagonize the
hegemons. The credit crisis has shaken the country, and has abated much of its political and
strategic ambitions due to decreased capital and a weakened position to the Big Three.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
The Caspian states will continue to be an overlooked region of the world for most, but
will only continue to grow in importance to the Big Three. The region offers an incredible
amount of natural resources vital to the economies of the US, Russia, and China. In addition,
their strategic location only increases their value to the Big Three. The Russians have already
spoken out in disapproval of the increased presence the US has taken in the region, and have
made attempts to strengthen their own influence. The Chinese have established themselves as
willing to give Caspian state governments funds, equipment, and training to build new and
expanding infrastructure in exchange for lucrative resource deals.
The actions of the Big Three exemplify Harvey’s conditionality of accumulation by
dispossession and Arrighi’s theory of neoliberalist expansion. Their continued expansion in the
region furthers influence for each. This is also the underlying theme of hegemonic conflict. Each
of the Big Three seek goals in the Caspian states, and among them is keeping the others in check.
Each has gone about this differently, but the ultimate goal remains the same. In addition,
Arrighi’s theory of declining hegemonic influence being backed up by military presence is
shown through the US’s policy of establishing long-term airbases in Kyrgyzstan. Russian
opposition to the construction of a series of new pipelines that would skirt Russian territory
supports the conditionality of accumulation by dispossession, and increasing Chinese and
American financial aid demonstrate both the spatial fix and hegemonic conflict. This results in
the uneven development of the Caspian states. Those with more to offer in terms of resources
(Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan) or strategic locations (Kyrgyzstan) have seen their
economies receive lucrative aid from the US. Russia continues to treat each of the Caspian states
as former members of an empire, and is often the first choice of aid the Caspian states seek. The
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Chinese have taken a different approach, selling goods and supporting construction efforts in
exchange for resource access. These are all tools of the spatial fix, and each continues both the
hegemonic conflict and uneven development of the region.
This thesis will hopefully contribute to the field of geography by firstly discussing a
region of the world most know little about. Further, understanding and analyzing why the
world’s superpowers have such interest in the region, what their intentions are, and how they
pursue those interests will add to the discipline. It will also demonstrate how major figures in
human geography in Harvey and Arrighi’s conditionalities and theories operate. Understanding
hegemonic conflict, the spatial fix, dispossession, and uneven development and using that
knowledge to demonstrate what the Big Three are willing to do for their goals furthers research
and knowledge of how humans operate in space.
When considering Harvey and Arrighi’s principles, the actions of the Big Three will
continue the uneven development of the Caspian states, unless an unforeseen events occur in the
future. The Caspian states offer the proper conditions for easing Harvey’s spatial fix in the case
of the USA and China, as well as Arrighi’s theory of hegemonic decline in the cases of Russia
and the USA. The leaders of the Caspians states would generally gain the most from the
continued hegemonic conflict in the region, however, the citizens of the countries involved face
the consequences of successful hegemonic gains. As resource extraction continues, the
adaptability of the Caspians states warrants continued attention. Potential focus on the top-down
ramifications of policy of the governments of the Caspian states could offer authentic examples
of actual improvements; however, in the views of the researcher, this would reveal the real
uneven development in the Caspian states.
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